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Abstract 
This study examines the accuracy of the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM), a 
frequently administered measure for evaluating effort during neurocognitive testing. In the 
last few years, several authors have suggested that the initial recognition trial of the TOMM 
(Trial 1) might be a more useful index for detecting feigned or exaggerated impairment 
than Trial 2, which is the source for inference recommended by the original instruction 
manual (Tombaugh, 1996). We used latent class modeling (LCM) implemented in a 
Bayesian framework to evaluate archival Trial 1 and Trial 2 data collected from 1198 
adults who had undergone outpatient forensic evaluations. All subjects were tested with 
two other performance validity tests (the Word Memory Test and the Computerized 
Assessment of Response Bias), and for 70% of the subjects, data from the California Verbal 
Learning Test–Second Edition Forced Choice trial were also available. Our results suggest 
that not even a perfect score on Trial 1 or Trial 2 justifies saying that an evaluee is 
definitely responding genuinely, although such scores imply a lower-than-base-rate 
probability of feigning. If one uses a Trial 2 cut-off higher than the manual’s 
recommendation, Trial 2 does better than Trial 1 at identifying individuals who are almost 
certainly feigning while maintaining a negligible false positive rate. Using scores from both 
trials, one can identify a group of definitely feigning and very likely feigning subjects who 
comprise about two-thirds of all feigners; only 1 percent of the members of this group 
would not be feigning.  
Keywords: malingering; Test of Memory Malingering; gold standard; receiver operating 
characteristic; latent class methods; Bayesian models 
 
Introduction 
After completing all the steps that comprise an evaluation, the fundamental question 
a mental health professional tries to answer is, “Given the evidence that I have assembled, 
what should I conclude?” In assessments done for treatment purposes, asking this question 
and responding to it are rarely explicit processes; instead, the clinician usually has as a set 
of tacit hypotheses about the patient that are tested and reconsidered as the patient 
undergoes treatment to alleviate whatever problems led to the clinical encounter.  
In forensic mental health assessments, however, the evaluator is much more likely 
to ask, “What should I conclude?” explicitly (Wills, 2008). One reason is that forensic 
assessments typically are efforts to reach conclusions that can be stated with “reasonable 
medical (or scientific) certainty.” Also, to the extent that an evaluator’s truth-seeking 
efforts may not lead to the outcome the forensic evaluee desires, the forensic evaluee has 
an external motive to deceive the evaluator. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Editions of the 
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders therefore recommend having a 
heightened suspicion of malingering in any evaluation that takes place in a “medicolegal 
context.” 
To decide whether an evaluee is feigning or exaggerating mental symptoms or 
cognitive impairment, mental health evaluators use three approaches, either separately or 
in combination. First, mental health professionals compare what an evaluee reports or says 
about symptoms to what patients who have no motive to look impaired say about mental 
problems (see, e.g., Resnick & Knoll, 2008). Second, evaluators sometimes can identify 
inconsistencies between an evaluee’s report and what appears in records or in other 
persons’ outside-the-office observations (Resnick, West, & Payne, 2008). Third, mental 
health evaluators can use symptom validity tests (SVTs; e.g., the Structured Interview of 
Reported Symptoms-2 [Rogers, Sewell, & Gillard, 2010]) or performance validity tests 
(PVTs; e.g., the Validity Indicator Profile [Frederick & Crosby, 2000]) developed specifically 
to detect dishonest symptom reporting or less-than-full cognitive effort during the 
evaluation. 
Of these approaches to detecting feigned symptoms or impairment, SVTs and PVTs 
are the best candidates for generating quantitative answers to the forensic evaluator’s 
question, “What should I conclude?” The reason: SVTs and PVTs produce numerical results 
that could help evaluators make mathematical statements about the probability of feigning, 
given the evidence. If, for example, a PVT designer had previously assembled data about 
PVT scores from evaluees who were known for certain to have answered honestly and 
from evaluees known for certain to have feigned or exaggerated their impairment, the 
evaluator could use those data to calculate likelihood ratios or other accuracy statistics; 
these statistics, combined with base rate information, would lead to numerical conclusions 
about the probability of less-than-full effort (Mossman & Hart, 1996; Mossman, 2000).  
The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996) is a popular PVT for 
reasons that include its relative ease of administration and the logic behind its design. Yet 
many authors have noted that the TOMM has limited sensitivity in detecting suboptimal 
effort if the results are interpreted in accordance with the standard scoring rule prescribed 
by the test manual (i.e., classify feigning if the Trial 2 score falls below 90% correct). This 
may be because savvy evaluees (or their attorneys) learn about SVTs and PVTs from legal 
citations (Kaufmann, 2009) and Internet resources—such as a Wikipedia article (“Test of 
Memory Malingering,” 2016)—and can decide that during the administration of the TOMM, 
they should take care to not do too poorly. Other evaluees who intend to display subtle-
but-phony impairment may realize by Trial 2 that the task is not as difficult as it first 
seems, or they may discern the purpose of the TOMM by mentally comparing it with other 
measures. In this respect, the TOMM likely shares a limitation with other effort measures 
(Denning, 2012; Guilmette, Whelihan, Hart, Sporadeo, & Buongiorno, 1996; Marshall et al., 
2010). 
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For these reasons, several recent articles have suggested that the initial recognition 
trial of the TOMM (Trial 1) might be a more useful index for detecting feigned impairment 
(Denning, 2012; Denning, 2014; Kulas, Axelrod, & Rinaldi, 2014; Schroeder, Baade, Peck, & 
Heinrichs, 2011). Denning (2012) reviewed and summarized more than 20 studies 
available as of 2012 that report cut-off scores or accuracy indices for Trial 1, and he 
described findings from his own data to suggest that Trial 1 might be a more satisfactory 
PVT.  
In all these studies and those published since, however, investigators have examined 
Trial 1 using a less-than-perfect criterion for non-genuine responding. Most commonly, the 
criterion has been another effort measure (such as the Medical Symptom Validity Test 
[Green, 2004]; see Denning, 2012 for an example), other sections of the TOMM (e.g., 
Armistead-Jehle & Hansen, 2011), or combinations of measures (e.g., Kulas, Axelrod, & 
Rinaldi, 2014; Schroeder et al., 2013). In some cases, investigators excluded cases that did 
not meet their criteria for unambiguously “poor effort” or “good effort” (e.g., failing at least 
two other PVTs, versus “passing” all other PVTs; see Kulas et al., 2014, p. 238). In other 
studies, investigators have tried to establish a specific, single Trial 1 cut-off score based on 
some independent criterion, such as perfect specificity when compared to a particular Trial 
2 score (see Denning, 2012, Table 1 for examples) or “acceptable” specificity, usually >90% 
when compared with the study’s criterion of truth (see Gunner, Miele, Lynch, & McCaffrey, 
2012, Schroeder et al., 2013, and Kulas et al., 2014 for recent examples).  
Although all the methods described in the previous paragraph represent reasonable 
approaches, they share a limitation: all require using an imperfect “gold standard” for the 
true status of subjects and/or an arbitrary, single cut-off to classify subjects. Because of 
this, the resulting accuracy indices incorporate systematic misclassification errors that 
potentially bias and limit findings. In this article, we describe results from applying latent 
class modeling (LCM) methods similar to those used by Mossman, Wygant, and Gervais 
(2012) to examine “real-world” Trial 1 responses from 1198 forensic evaluees. Our hope 
was that LCM techniques would let us make inferences about the diagnostic properties of 
Trial 1 and compare these to Trial 2 without having to use an imperfect “gold standard” to 
categorize study subjects. 
 
Method 
Study Subjects 
Because the present research used de-identified archival data, it received a 
designation of “exempt” from the institutional review board of the University of Cincinnati. 
The data originated from 2627 consecutive evaluees who underwent outpatient 
assessment at the third author’s office practice. Nothing in pre-evaluation information or 
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the third author’s evaluation findings suggested that any evaluee had a severe cognitive 
impairment (e.g., dementia or intellectual disability) that would have required special 
cautions beyond those normally applicable to a psychological evaluation. 
Our statistical methods (discussed later in this section) required that individuals 
have undergone evaluation with multiple measures that test for a similar type of 
impression management. We therefore focused on individuals in the dataset whose 
evaluations included administration of the TOMM, the Computerized Assessment of 
Response Bias (CARB; Allen, Conder, Green, & Cox, 1997), and the Word Memory Test 
(WMT; Green, Allen, & Astner, 1996; Green, 2003). This requirement removed just over 
half the evaluees (i.e., 1326 individuals) from the subject pool. The remaining 1301 
evaluees included 28 persons who did not speak English well enough to take the PVTs in 
English. We excluded these persons from the analysis. We also excluded individuals who 
had undergone evaluations for treatment purposes and were not evaluated in a forensic 
context (e.g., Worker’s Compensation Board). The treatment-oriented evaluees included 15 
widows of workers who had been killed on the job or who had died from a progressive 
work-related condition (e.g., mesothelioma), and 60 individuals who were not seeking 
compensation and underwent evaluation to guide psychological treatment. The resulting 
sample thus included 2627 – (1326+28+15+60) = 1198 evaluees who underwent 
assessment related to worker’s compensation claims (n = 897, 74.9%), their involvement 
in civil litigation (e.g., plaintiffs in personal injury cases, n = 224, 18.7%), both worker’s 
compensation and lawsuits (n = 7, 0.6%), disability insurance claims (n = 64, 5.3%), and 
pension claims (n = 6, 0.5%).  
Most (n = 730, 60.9%) persons in the sample were men. The sample’s mean age was 
40.4 (SD = 11.0) years; the mean education level was 11.6 (SD = 2.5) years. One-eighth (n 
= 148, 12.4%) of the sample subjects spoke languages other than English (including 
Punjabi, Mandarin, Arabic, Spanish, Polish, and Ukrainian) as their primary language, 
although all these evaluees completed the PVTs in English. In these 148 individuals, the 
mean WAIS-IV Verbal IQ score was 83.2 (SD = 11.6), mean Performance IQ was 86.7 (SD = 
14.5), and mean Full Scale IQ score was 83.2 (SD = 11.6). Their scores were lower than the 
scores of the native English speakers: Verbal IQ = 97.2 (SD = 12.7), Performance IQ = 
101.8 (SD = 14.4), and Full Scale IQ = 99.1 (SD = 13.2).  
Motor vehicle accidents were the reported source of injury for 238 members 
(19.9%) of the sample; 893 individuals (74.5%) reported being injured at work. The 
reported physical problems were mainly musculoskeletal and orthopedic injuries. Primary 
sites of pain as specified on the Multidimensional Pain Inventory (Kerns, Turk, & Rudy, 
1985) were head, face, or mouth (n = 121, 10.1%); neck (n = 136, 13.6%); shoulders or 
upper extremities (n = 223, 18.6%); lower back (n = 289, 24.1%); and lower extremities 
(n = 117, 9.8%). Primary psychiatric diagnoses  were rendered by the third author in 
accordance with then-current DSM-IV or DSM-IV-TR criteria using referral documentation 
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and all data gleaned from the assessments, which included findings from detailed clinical 
interviews of the evaluees plus the psychological test results.  
Four-fifths of the sample had diagnoses of chronic pain (32%), anxiety or 
posttraumatic stress disorder (30%), or depression (17%). As the previous paragraph 
notes, one-tenth of the sample had primary pain sites that involved the head and face, and 
about one-half these individuals reported physical problems that could have involved brain 
trauma. The remaining evaluees had problems such as temporomandibular joint pain. After 
accounting for other psychiatric conditions, 15 (1.3%) members of the total subject group 
had primary diagnoses of head injury, and two (0.2%) had other neurological conditions. 
These 17 subjects were not undergoing evaluations for purposes of neuropsychological 
assessment. They had already undergone detailed neuropsychological evaluations 
elsewhere that had detected no neurological or neuropsychological impairment severe 
enough to prevent them from returning to work, but the presence of other, comorbid 
psychological issues had not necessarily been evaluated. These subjects (along with the 
others in our sample) had no apparent, neurologically based reason for not being able to 
“pass” performance validity tests. None had obvious impairments in conversation, and all 
were community-living outpatients (i.e., they did not come from residential or hospital 
treatment settings) who traveled independently or with relatives for their assessments. 
Test Data  
The WMT, CARB, and TOMM yield several scores from which an evaluator might 
make judgments about possible feigned cognitive impairment. For this study, we used: 
 a total WMT score obtained by combining the immediate recognition (IR), delayed 
recognition (DR), and consistency scores;  
 a final CARB score calculated from all three blocks of the instrument, with imputed 
scores based on the stopping rules if evaluees scored 100% on a block;  
 the simple numerical results from Trial 1 and Trial 2 of the TOMM.  
Most (843, or 70.4%) of the subjects also had test data available for an additional proposed 
measure of malingering, the Forced Choice trial of the California Verbal Learning Test–
Second Edition (CVLTFC; Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Ober, 2000), and we included these 
subjects’ numerical scores in our analyses.  
Approaching the Data without a Gold Standard 
Because forensic mental health professionals rarely know for certain whether a 
given evaluee has responded genuinely, investigators have tried to assess the accuracy of 
PVTs and SVTs in two ways. In so-called “known group” or “criterion” studies, investigators 
evaluate discrimination power of validity measures by comparing the responses of 
evaluees believed to be responding genuinely with evaluees believed to be feigning or 
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exaggerating problems. In “simulation” studies, investigators ask non-symptomatic 
(“healthy”) subjects to answer test items as the subjects believe persons with mental 
disorders or cognitive impairments would. The investigators then compare these subjects’ 
simulated responses to those of persons who actually are mentally ill or cognitively 
compromised but who have no known motivation to look more ill or impaired than they 
really are.  
Each of these methods has limitations, however. Because no gold standard 
establishes the truth in known-group studies, investigators must either exclude ambiguous 
cases or accept that some feigning or non-feigning subjects may be misclassified. In 
simulation studies, subjects’ true status is known, but investigators do not know how well 
simulators’ behavior resembles the efforts of real feigners who undergo real forensic 
evaluations. 
To get around these problems, Mossman and colleagues (2012) used an approach 
based on principles of latent class modeling (LCM) (Uebersax & Grove, 1990), which has 
helped investigators in several areas of medicine (Henkelman, Kay, & Bronskill, 1990) and 
in related fields (e.g., Choi, Johnson, Collins, & Gardner, 2006; Jafarzadeh, Johnson, & 
Gardner, 2016 [cattle infections]). Broadly, this approach involves developing a data model 
that includes the accuracy parameters, then obtaining data from subjects who have 
undergone evaluation for a condition with more than one diagnostic method. If the 
resulting number of data categories exceeds the number of parameters in the data model, it 
may be possible to identify those model parameters—which would mean that the 
investigator could specify the diagnostic methods’ accuracy parameters without ever 
knowing the true status of the subjects.  
ROC Analysis 
Most reports on efforts measures refer to a single PVT score or “cut-off.” For 
example, the standard interpretation of the TOMM is that a Trial 2 score below 90% 
indicates feigned memory impairment, and reports on the accuracy of the TOMM typically 
refer to single values of sensitivity and specificity associated with this cut-off. In our view, 
however, this approach to interpreting results omits two key considerations relevant to 
understanding the information that PVTs produce.  
First, PVTs have several possible scores, and the lower a score, the stronger the 
evidence for non-genuine responding. Use of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
analysis allows the investigator to evaluate the discrimination characteristics of a PVT at 
several cut-offs and to quantify trade-offs between sensitivity and specificity as the cut-off 
is moved through the test’s full range of possible operating points. Knowing sensitivity and 
specificity at several cut-offs allows one to create a ROC graph for a test, which is a plot of 
the test’s true positive rate (tpr, which equals test sensitivity) as a function of the false 
positive rate (fpr = 1 – test specificity). Because a finite number of cut-offs is actually used, 
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the points that represent (fpr, tpr) pairs may be connected by line segments, and the areas 
underneath each segment (calculated using the trapezoidal rule) can be summed to find a 
nonparametric estimate of the total area under the ROC curve (AUC). AUC is a useful 
summary of accuracy that, in the present application, equals the probability that the PVT 
will correctly classify two randomly chosen subjects—one feigning and one responding 
honestly—by assigning a lower score to the feigning subject. An AUC of 1.0 would imply 
perfect sorting, and an AUC of 0.5 would imply no-better-than-chance discrimination 
between invalidly responding and validly responding subjects. 
Second, PVT results are evidence that, if used optimally, should alter or revise one’s 
belief about the probability that the evaluee is feigning impairment. This Bayesian 
interpretation of a PVT result implies that we would like information about the tests that 
let an evaluator answer the question, “Now that I have this result, what should I believe 
about this evaluee?” If we can somehow establish the values of the ROC parameters for the 
PVT, the answer to this question will follow directly. 
Our analyses used a Bayesian framework to locate values for the ROC parameters of 
the PVTs we studied. Essentially, our data analysis asked, “Given these subjects’ PVT 
results, what should we make of them? Given our study data, what should we believe about 
the ROC accuracy parameters for these PVTs?” To answer this question, we set about 
obtaining estimates of (fpr, tpr) pairs using the nonparametric model described by Albert 
(2007) and used in previous studies by Mossman and colleagues (Mossman et al., 2010; 
Mossman et al., 2012). Bayesian estimation methods summarize knowledge about 
unknown parameter values using ‘‘posterior’’ distributions that represent the probability 
that a parameter has a particular value, given the observed data.  
Bayes’s Rule states that the posterior probability of a parameter’s value is 
proportional to the likelihood of observing the data given that parameter value, multiplied 
by a “prior” probability of the parameter’s value. This approach is somewhat like maximum 
likelihood estimation (which provides point estimates for the parameter values that are 
most likely to have generated the observed data), and when priors are chosen so as to be 
“non-informative,” Bayesian and MLE results are often numerically similar (Carlin & Louis, 
2009). Bayesian results differ from MLE results in an important theoretical way, however. 
MLE results tell us things like, “We can have 95% confidence that a confidence interval 
constructed with this estimation method will contain the true value of a parameter.” 
Bayesian estimation summarizes what we should believe about a parameter’s true value 
via its “credible interval,” which represents a direct probability statements about the 
parameters—for example, “the probability is 95% that parameter θ for PVT j lies between x 
and y” or “given John Doe’s PVT result, the probability that he feigned impairment is 
greater than 95 percent.” 
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 We ran our Bayesian analyses in OpenBUGS, a free, open-source software program 
that is one of the successors to WinBUGS (Lunn, Spiegelhalter, Thomas, & Best, 2009). Like 
WinBUGS, OpenBUGS lets investigators use Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods 
(Gelfand & Smith, 1990; Geman & Geman, 1984; Metropolis, Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, 
Teller, & Teller, 1953) to generate posterior distributions from which the investigators 
draw Bayesian inferences about the parameter values. MCMC methods lead to inferences 
about posterior distributions for parameters of complex models if (as we hoped would be 
true for our data) mild regularity conditions are met such that a Markov chain will 
converge to a unique ‘‘target’’ distribution. This target distribution consists of the most 
plausible ranges for the parameters of interest—here, the parameters that, taken together, 
describe the accuracy of the PVTs we studied. 
 To use MCMC methods for our Bayesian analysis, we prepared OpenBUGS code 
modified from the WinBUGS code used by Mossman and colleagues (2012). The transition 
kernel made the target distribution of the resulting Markov chain the joint posterior 
distribution of model parameters. To assure model identification, we found it necessary to 
use a modestly informative Beta (6.3, 13.3) prior for the prevalence of feigning, which 
implies that one is 99% sure the true value lies between 0.1 and 0.6. We ran two parallel 
MCMC chains, and these appeared to converge after approximately 500 updates. We ran 
each chain for 20,000 updates, discarded each chain’s first 10,000 “burn-in” updates, and 
used the remaining 10,000 values for inference. 
 Ideally, we would have used both Trial 1 and Trial 2 simultaneously in our analyses. 
We found, however, that doing so caused the TOMM scores to “overwhelm” the other 
data—that is, the OpenBUGS algorithm identified a model in which the TOMM was taken to 
be the truth, a conclusion at odds with what is known regarding the TOMM’s limited 
sensitivity. We therefore analyzed the accuracy of Trial 1 separately from Trial 2, by using 
either a combination of the WMT, CARB, CVLTFC, and Trial 1, or a combination of the WMT, 
CARB, CVLTFC, and Trial 2. 
“Agnostic” and “Partial Truth” Analyses 
We approached our data analyses in two ways, which (following Mossman et al., 
2012) we term agnostic and partial truth. In the agnostic approach, we used as the sole 
information available four PVT scores from the subjects (i.e., WMT-CARB-CVLTFC-Trial 1, 
or WMT-CARB-CVLTFC-Trial 2). Consistent with the comments above, the agnostic 
approach completely avoids the problem of trying to establish the group membership of 
each subject before attempting to estimate accuracy parameters; it simply lets the PVT data 
tell the story.  
One might argue, however, that the agnostic approach excludes some information 
from the analysis if we know enough to classify some of the subjects as honest or invalid 
responders with virtual certainty. We therefore should incorporate this partial-truth 
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information into the parameter estimation process.  
One source of additional information about the model parameters estimated from 
the WMT-CARB-CVLTFC-Trial 1 scores is our knowledge of the subjects’ Trial 2 scores. The 
motivation for making inferences about malingering based on TOMM Trial 1 rather than 
Trial 2 is not just shorter administration time, but the belief that by the second trial, some 
evaluees realize that the recognition task is not as difficult as first appearance suggests. 
This means that using the standard cut-off, Trial 2 results are highly specific, and as the 
results presented in the next section show, false positive interpretations are rare enough to 
be negligible.  
For our partial truth analyses of the WMT-CARB-CVLT-Trial 1 data, we assigned 146 
subjects to a “definitely responding invalidly” group. This group included 125 subjects who 
scored below 90% on Trial 2, plus an additional 21 subjects who scored within or below 
the random responding range on at least two other PVTs (that is, below 65% on the DR or 
IR section of the WMT, and below 58% on the CARB). Such results, we reasoned, could not 
reflect valid responding: the study data came from an outpatient office to which most 
subjects had traveled independently, and the subjects did not have conditions such as 
dementia that could lead to genuine, no-better-than-chance responding. We also assigned 
35 subjects to a “definitely not feigning” group. All these subjects had attained the highest 
possible scores on all the SVTs. Here, we reasoned that whether a subject intended to 
engage in impression management or not, a perfect score on all PVTs implied that the 
subject was not using these measures to feign impairment.  
 
Results 
On the PVTs examined for this study, the subjects produced the following results 
(summarized as mean percentages of correct answers ± SD, with the range of results in 
parentheses):  
 WMT: 88.3±13.5 (35–100) 
 CARB: 94.9±11.3 (15–100) 
 TOMM1: 90.1±12.7 (34–100) 
 TOMM2: 96.3±10.6 (20–100) 
 CVLTFC: 88.7±14.1 (0–100) 
[place Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 shows the AUC estimates (with 95% credible intervals) for the four PVTs 
under the agnostic and partial-truth data assumptions. As was true in Mossman and 
colleagues’ (2012) study, all PVTs outdid chance sorting of feigned versus genuine 
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cognitive impairment, with the WMT providing superior discrimination. 
[place Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 about here] 
For our present purposes, however, the key finding is that agnostic and partial-truth 
assumptions yielded similar results. We show this graphically in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
Figures 1 and 2 show ROC graphs for the data runs that used Trial 1; Figures 3 and 4 show 
the ROC graphs from the data runs that used Trial 2. Visual inspection confirms what Table 
1 shows numerically: the AUCs for the studies are similar, and the ROC operating points 
occupy positions in the ROC square that are similar whether one assumes completed 
ignorance or partial information about the feigning status of some evaluees. 
 [place Figures 5 and 6 about here] 
We turn now to our chief area of interest, the performance of Trials 1 and 2 of the 
TOMM. Figure 5 shows the ROC graphs for Trial 1 and Trial 2 under the agnostic data 
model, and Figure 6 contains the graphs derived from the partial truth model. Inspection of 
both Figures shows that Trial 1 is associated with a much larger AUC, but the ROC graphs 
cross each other close to the left vertical axis. This means that AUC alone may not be an 
adequate basis for comparing the discriminatory power of the two trials.  
[place Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
Tables 2 and 3 provide detailed bases for judgments about what scores on Trials 1 
and 2 imply. As implemented in our OpenBUGS code, estimating operating points required 
grouping the TOMM scores into ordinal categories. We grouped the subjects’ TOMM Trial 1 
and Trial 2 scores such that they fell into the 10 categories shown in the “score” columns of 
Tables 2 and 3. The “percentage of subjects” columns show the proportion of subjects who 
fell into each category.  
 One formulation of Bayes’s Theorem expresses the posterior odds as the product of 
the prior odds and the likelihood ratio. Here, we are interested in these relationships as 
they relate to the presence of feigning (denoted as M, for “malingering”) and to a given test 
result T. We can therefore write: 
 O(M : ¬M|T) = Λ(M : ¬M|T) • O(M : ¬M) 
where the odds, O(•), equals p(•)/[1−p(•)], “¬” is the symbol for logical negation, and 
Λ(•|T) is the likelihood ratio associated with T. We next introduce the stratum-specific 
likelihood ratio (SSLR; Pierce & Cornell, 1993) to denote the likelihood ratio associated 
with a particular stratum or category of test results. The SSLR relates directly to a ROC 
graph in that the SSLR equals the slope of that portion of the graph that corresponds to the 
test result category. Thus, in Figures 5 and 6, the 10 segments that make up each ROC 
graph have slopes that equal the SSLRs for the respective test-result categories. Readers 
can gain a rough idea of the SSLRs from examining Figures 5 and 6; the actual SSLR values 
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(to two significant digits) appear in Tables 2 and 3. Note that one calculates the SSLRk for 
Tk, a test result that falls into category k, from the (fpr, tpr) pairs as follows: 
 
1
1





cc
cc
k
fprfpr
tprtpr
SSLR  
where c = {0, 1, 2, …, K}, c = {1, 2, …, K−1} are the nine (fpr, tpr) pairs that correspond to the 
cut-offs that delimit the K result categories, fprc−1 = tprc−1 = 1, and fprc=K = tprc=K = 0. 
 To calculate the post-test probabilities shown in Tables 2 and 3, we assumed that 
the prevalence or pre-test probability of feigning, p(M), is 0.3, an assumption supported by 
the findings shown in Table 1. Therefore, the pre-test odds of feigning, O(M : ¬M) was 3:7, 
and the values shown for p(M|T1) and p(M|T2) come from the product of 3/7 and the SSLR 
values. 
As was true for the AUCs shown in Table 1, Tables 2 and 3 show that the results 
under the agnostic and partial-truth assumptions are similar and permit a single set of 
judgments about various Trial 1 and Trial 2 scores: 
● Two-thirds (65.5%) of the subjects had Trial 1 scores of 46 correct or better. 
Concerning these subjects (or future subjects drawn from a sufficiently similar 
population), it would be reasonable to say that their Trial 1 performance means 
they have a below-base-rate probability of feigning or exaggerating cognitive 
impairment. In a few cases, however, Trial 2 scores might alter this opinion (as we 
explain further below).  
● About one-sixth of our subjects (15.9%) had Trial 1 scores of 42 to 45. Such results 
provide less clarity about subjects’ intentions. Another 8% had scores of 37 to 40; 
these results are strong (but not certainty-inducing) evidence of feigning 
impairment.  
● An evaluee who gets 36 or fewer answers correct on Trial 1 is almost certainly 
feigning or exaggerating cognitive impairment. Just 10.7% of the subjects did this 
poorly. Thus, if one required this level of certainty before declaring that an evaluee 
is feigning, one would identify little more than a third of those evaluees who actually 
were feigning.  
● No score on the Trial 2—not even all 50 correct—rules out malingering, although a 
perfect score is evidence that favors genuine responding. 
● A Trial 2 score of 49 does not favor a conclusion for or against feigning. 
● One out of 17 subjects in our study (N = 69, 5.8%) got Trial 2 scores of 45 to 48. 
Under the customary rules of test interpretation, one would not regard scores in this 
range as indicative of feigning. Yet a score of 47 or 48 is good evidence of feigning, 
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and scores of 45 and 46 are strong evidence of doing less than one’s best. 
● One-tenth (10.4%) of the subjects scored below 45 on Trial 2, the cut-off for 
feigning that the TOMM manual (Tombaugh 1996) prescribes and that most 
neuropsychologists use for result interpretation. Although we can be highly 
confident that these subjects were performing below their true level of functioning, 
they represent only a third of all the subjects who were feigning or exaggerating 
their cognitive impairment. 
[place Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 provides another way to understand our findings. There, we show the 
TOMM Trial 1 and Trial 2 scores for all 1198 subjects. One sees that according the TOMM 
manual’s criterion, 125 (10.4%) of all the subjects scored low enough on Trial 2 to be 
deemed feigners. If one adds to this group any subject whose Trial 1 or Trial 2 score 
implies that the posterior probability of feigning was 0.99 or greater, then an additional 36 
feigners (3.5% of all subjects) are detected. An additional 89 subjects (7.4% of the total 
group) had a greater-than-80% posterior probability of suboptimal effort.  
Thus, 250 subjects had at least an 80% probability of feigning or exaggerating 
impairment. If the base rate of feigning among the subjects was exactly 30%, then 359 
subjects actually were feigning. Based on their posterior probabilities, 241 of the 250 
subjects in the at-least-80% feigning categories were actually feigning or exaggerating. 
Therefore, the at-least-80% feigning categories contain 241 actual feigners (that is, about 
two-thirds of all feigners), plus 9 of the 839 non-feigning subjects. Put another way, 
designating all at-least-80% subjects as feigners would miss one-third of the actual feigners 
and would incorrectly identify 1% of the honest subjects. 
One final feature of Table 4 deserves mention: it illustrates the presence of 
ambiguous results. Above, we explained that Trial 1 scores ≥46 support genuine 
responding. Yet six of the subjects who produced such scores had Trial 2 scores of 47 or 48, 
strongly suggesting feigning. The best explanation: these individuals were giving sub-
optimal effort, evidenced by Trial 2 scores that showed no improvement over Trial 1, or (in 
two cases) worse performance.  
 
Discussion 
Although questions about evaluees’ motivation and the validity of findings often 
arise in research and clinical treating settings, most (if not all) forensic mental health 
evaluations occur under conditions that require examiners to consider explicitly whether 
interview findings and test results reflect feigned or exaggerated impairment. Many 
combinations of motivations and situational incentives can make malingering an attractive 
choice, and feigning or exaggerating neurocognitive problems is a recognized coping 
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strategy for some forensic evaluees involved in civil and criminal litigation (Resnick & 
Knoll, 2008). In outpatient evaluation settings, examiners often have limited observational 
data from which to judge the genuineness of reported neurocognitive impairment, which 
helps to explain the popularity of using scales that are “embedded” within psychological 
test materials or tools developed expressly to detect feigned or exaggerated impairment. In 
addition, embedded or malingering-specific effort measures often allow evaluators to 
render judgments about malingering for which they can cite numerically based empirical 
support. 
Our approach to examining and comparing inferences from Trials 1 and 2 of the 
TOMM differed from other investigators’ studies in two ways. First, we used other PVT 
scores to evaluate the TOMM’s accuracy, but we did not try to create criterion groups based 
on those PVT scores. Instead, we let OpenBUGS make simultaneous, Bayesian inferences 
about group membership and the accuracy indices of all PVTs. To put this another way: 
rather than declaring that certain PVTs established the “truth” about subjects’ malingering 
status when we know those PVTs are imperfect, we asked OpenBUGS to answer the 
question, “Given the data before us, what things about the accuracy of these PVTs are most 
reasonable for us to believe?”  
Second, we recognized explicitly that the TOMM produces graded results that justify 
weaker or stronger beliefs about the likelihood that an individual is malingering. Rather 
than reduce TOMM results to “yes” or “no” based on our opinion about what level or 
sensitivity or specificity is appropriate, we used ROC methods to characterize the degree to 
which a particular TOMM score should alter an evaluator’s pretest belief about the 
likelihood that an evaluee is attempting to feign or exaggerate neurocognitive impairment. 
 Other investigators (e.g., Denning, 2012) have reported AUCs for TOMM Trial 1 of 
greater than 0.90. In our study, Trial 1 AUCs exceeded AUCs for Trial 2 but fell below 0.85. 
We attribute this to our different way of evaluating data. We did not attempt to exclude any 
subjects whose performance might have been “hard” to categorize as genuine versus non-
honest, a decision that virtually guarantees lower sorting accuracy.  
Our results also paint a different picture of Trial 1 and Trial 2 scores than other 
investigators have suggested. We found that if one sets Trial 1 and Trial 2 cut-offs low 
enough to achieve near-certain confidence that an evaluee’s effort was suboptimal, one will 
achieve a detection sensitivity of about 40%. If one can settle for feeling “at least 80% 
confident” that an individual has given less than full effort, then about 19% of our subjects 
had Trial 1 scores and 16% had Trial 2 scores that indicated suboptimal effort. Notice, 
however, that in the case of the Trial 2, this required interpreting scores of 48 or lower as 
indicating feigned or exaggerated impairment.  
Our findings suggest some advantages that LCM methods have over approaches to 
evaluating malingering measures that use “known” groups of subjects or simulators. We 
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did not have to use imperfect truth criteria or exclude ambiguous cases from our analyses, 
yet our results retained so-called “ecological” validity in that they came from evaluees in 
real testing situations. For the following reasons, however, we ask that readers view our 
findings with skepticism and cautiousness. 
(1) Our data came from a single evaluation context. Although our findings 
concerning the TOMM are consistent with those of other investigators (see, e.g., Fox, 2011; 
Frederick & Bowden, 2009; Gervais, Rohling, Green, & Ford, 2004; Mossman, Miller, Lee, 
Gervais, Hart, & Wygant, 2015), they do not represent definitive judgments about the 
performance of the TOMM. We might well have had different findings to report had we 
examined data from psychiatric inpatients, from individuals who had suffered 
demonstrably serious brain trauma, or from criminal defendants who were facing 
prosecution. 
(2) Although our prior-knowledge assumptions yielded similar results, our data 
models were not the only conceivable ones. We also attempted to evaluate our data using 
the conventional “binormal” ROC model and the dual-beta model recently proposed by 
Mossman and Peng (2016). These models have the advantage of yielding smooth curves 
and potential superior inferences about operating points (for further discussion, see 
Mossman & Peng, 2016). However, implementing these models in OpenBUGS produced 
highly correlated chains that converged poorly (even after 10,000 iterations) and in some 
cases gave results that seemed implausible (e.g., prevalence values below 0.2, and AUCs 
above 0.90 for several PVTs).  
(3) As Uebersax (1988) notes, latent class methods yield upper bounds for accuracy 
because they choose underlying classes that minimize error rates. These error-minimizing 
latent classes can differ from the true classes if the probabilities of the empirical classes 
depend on covariates. Whether this actually is the case is hard to know (Spencer, 2012), 
but we do know that it is a clear possibility.  
(4) Our method of analysis also risked unintentionally mistaking reliability for 
validity. That is, we assumed that the subjects’ PVT scores represented valid ways of 
assessing (a) the subjects’ responses to being tested, (b) whether subjects were trying to 
look more impaired than was actually the case, and (c) in the case of those who engaged in 
impression management, how those subjects approached the other cognitive evaluation 
measures that were administered during their evaluations. Our statistical methods were 
limited by the fact that irrelevant yet highly reliable assessment methods (e.g., assessing 
malingering by counting letters in the evaluee’s last name) can appear very accurate. We 
could also run into this problem if most evaluees (including malingerers) knew about these 
tests and “played it straight” on the PVTs only. Many of our subjects’ PVTs scores were low 
enough that we doubt this was the case—that is, they did so poorly on the PVTs that 
exaggerating or feigning impairment was the only plausible explanation for their test 
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results. Nonetheless, this could have happened for a subset of actually malingering 
evaluees.  
(5) Our statistical inferences about malingering rates and PVT accuracy were based 
on PVT data alone, which is an approach that mental health professionals should not and 
ordinarily would not actually use. Usually, mental health professionals obtain additional 
data from the evaluation session and from outside sources (e.g., family members, treatment 
records) that are relevant to deciding how accurately evaluees are portraying themselves 
and their abilities. We did not use non-test data in our study because in general, such data 
are not quantified precisely and are therefore not amenable to the kinds of analysis we 
employed. If mental health professionals did generate such data from their assessment, 
however, then one could evaluate those data using the same methods we used here. If, for 
example, evaluators provided Likert-scale judgments about the probability of invalid 
responding based on their clinical data, the accuracy of those judgments could be treated as 
an “effort measure” to be evaluated along with other PVTs or SVTs, using the statistical 
approaches we employed.  
(6) As is true for most investigations of PVTs and SVTs, we evaluated our data under 
the assumption that subjects either gave valid responses or did not. Indeed, either evaluees 
do their best or they don’t, but those evaluees who do less than their best may feign or 
exaggerate with greater and lesser subtlety. Some disengaged evaluees simply do not put 
forth much effort (see Frederick & Bowden, 2009) but do not necessarily intend to perform 
at less than their best level. Our LCM model does not incorporate several notions that 
Rogers (2008) has emphasized: evaluees engage in malingering to different degrees, they 
have motivations that can affect PVT outcomes, and invalid responding has more causes 
than conscious effort to do worse than one’s actual ability level. Notwithstanding this 
limitation, we still believe it makes sense to draw a distinction between those evaluees who 
engage in compliant, honest responding and those who respond to testing in other ways. 
That is, we can know that non-genuine response styles take various forms while still 
believing—consistent with the approach taken by all investigators who have tried to 
quantify the accuracy of PVTs and SVTs—that evaluees either perform at their full ability 
or do not.  
 
Conclusion 
Several recent articles have provided theoretical and data-based arguments to 
suggest that Trial 1 of the TOMM is better than Trial 2 at detecting suboptimal effort in 
neurocognitive assessments. Our findings showed that for about half the evaluees, Trial 1 
data would allow an examiner to say, “This score means it’s unlikely that this individual 
was feigning or exaggerating impairment,” and to say this with at least as much confidence 
as a perfect Trial 2 result alone would justify. But given our data and statistical approach, 
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Trial 1 did not outperform Trial 2 in how often it would justify an examiner’s saying, “The 
evidence makes me virtually sure that this individual was feigning.”  
These TOMM-based characterizations of effort would apply only to evaluation 
settings similar to those that generated our study data. We hope readers will consider 
using the statistical techniques we have described to examine the TOMM and other 
measures used in psycholegal determinations. We also hope that our work will inspire 
development of additional ways to evaluate assessment tools used by forensic mental 
health professionals. 
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Table 1. – Bayesian estimates of the areas under the ROC curve (median AUCs and 95% credible intervals) for neurocognitive 
effort measures under the agnostic and partial-truth information assumptions. Values are rounded to two significant digits.  
Information 
Assumption 
AUC (95% credible interval)  
WMT CARB TOMM Trial 1 TOMM Trial 2 CVLTFC prevalence 
agnostic 
0.91 (0.84–0.96) 0.73 (0.66–0.80) 0.83 (0.76–0.89)  0.73 (0.65–0.80) 0.29 (0.23–0.38) 
0.92 (0.86–0.96) 0.73 (0.66–0.79)  0.76 (0.69–0.82) 0.72 (0.65–0.78) 0.32 (0.26–0.40) 
partial truth 
0.92 (0.88–0.95) 0.73 (0.67–0.79) 0.85 (0.80–0.90)  0.74 (0.68–0.80) 0.32 (0.27–0.40) 
0.94 (0.90–0.97) 0.75 (0.69–0.80)  0.78 (0.73–0.84) 0.74 (0.68–0.80) 0.30 (0.25–0.36) 
 
WMT = Word Memory Test 
CARB = Computerized Assessment of Response Bias 
TOMM Trial 1 = Test of Memory Malingering Trial 1 
TOMM Trial 2 = Test of Memory Malingering Trial 2 
CVLTFC = California Verbal Learning Test-II Forced Choice Trial 
prevalence = estimated portion of subjects who were feigning 
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Table 2. – Bayesian estimates (medians and 95% credible intervals) of the stratum-specific likelihood ratio (SSLR) and 
calculated posterior probability of feigning for a given score on Trial 1 of the TOMM [p(M|T1)] under the agnostic and partial-
truth assumptions about prior knowledge of subjects’ feigning status, assuming a feigning prevalence of 30 percent. Values 
are rounded to two significant digits.  
Trial 1 
score 
percentage 
of subjects 
agnostic partial truth 
SSLR p(M|T1) SSLR p(M|T1) 
49-50 37.8% 0.30  (0.16–0.50) 0.11 (0.065–0.18) 0.24 (0.14–0.39) 0.095 (0.056–0.14) 
48 11.4% 0.28  (0.087–0.60) 0.11 (0.036–0.21) 0.31 (0.12–0.60) 0.12 (0.049–0.20) 
47 8.6% 0.34  (0.12–0.78) 0.13 (0.048–0.25) 0.37 (0.13–0.78) 0.14 (0.055–0.25) 
46 7.7% 0.45  (0.12–1.0) 0.16 (0.049–0.30) 0.52 (0.19–1.1) 0.18 (0.076–0.32) 
45 5.4% 0.85  (0.24–2.0) 0.27 (0.092–0.46) 0.88 (0.32–2.0) 0.27 (0.12–0.46) 
44 3.8% 1.3  (0.20–3.5) 0.35 (0.078–0.60) 1.5 (0.48–3.9) 0.39 (0.17–0.63) 
42-43 6.7% 2.0  (0.82–5.1) 0.47 (0.26–0.69) 3.0 (1.3–7.1) 0.56 (0.35–0.75) 
40-41 4.2% 10  (4.3–29) 0.81 (0.65–0.93) 14 (5.6–51) 0.86 (0.71–0.96) 
37-39 3.8% 18  (6.9–92) 0.88 (0.75–0.98) 38 (11–5000) 0.94 (0.83–1) 
≤36 10.4% 200  (41–1.2×106) 0.99 (0.95–1) 9100 (220–1.2×1010) 1.00 (0.99–1) 
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Table 3. – Bayesian estimates (medians and 95% credible intervals) of the stratum-specific likelihood ratio (SSLR) and 
calculated posterior probability of feigning for a given score on Trial 2 of the TOMM [p(M|T2)] under the agnostic and partial-
truth assumptions about prior knowledge of subjects’ feigning status, assuming a feigning prevalence of 30 percent. Values 
are rounded to two significant digits.  
Trial 2 
score 
percentage 
of subjects 
agnostic partial truth 
SSLR p(M|T2) SSLR p(M|T2) 
50 75.1% 0.48 (0.35–0.61) 0.17 (0.13–0.21) 0.44 (0.31–0.54) 0.16 (0.12–0.19) 
49 8.7% 1.4 (0.67–2.4) 0.37 (0.22–0.51) 1.3 (0.63–2.4) 0.35 (0.21–0.5) 
48 2.8% 24 (6.8–740) 0.91 (0.74–1) 22 (6.8–300) 0.91 (0.74–0.99) 
47 1.3% 25 (4.6–19000) 0.91 (0.66–1) 26 (4.8–2.1 ×104) 0.92 (0.67–1) 
46 1.1% 210 (10–9.7×108) 0.99 (0.82–1) 420 (17–1.2×109) 0.99 (0.88–1) 
45 0.6% 2000 (12–8.3×1012) 1 (0.84–1) 1.5 ×104 (40–8.8×1013) 1 (0.94–1) 
43-44 1.7% 1.2 ×105 (40–5.9×1018) 1 (0.94–1) 2.9 ×106 (820–7.1×1018) 1 (1–1) 
41-44 1.3% 1.1 ×107 (230–5.4×1018) 1 (0.99–1) 3.4×108 (3200–6.4×1018) 1 (1–1) 
38-40 2.1% 2.7×109 (580–8.0×1018) 1 (1–1) 1.4×1011 (3.9×104–9.3×1018) 1 (1–1) 
≤37 5.3% 1.1×1012 (8800–1.1×1019) 1 (1–1) 7.7×1013 (4.2×105–1.3×1019) 1 (1–1) 
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Table 4. – Numbers of study subjects with various combinations of scores on Trial 1 and Trial 2 of the TOMM, with 
interpretation of performance validity. Numbers along the right and bottom margins of the table show marginal totals. Empty 
cells contain no subjects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Trial 2 scores  
 
 
50 49 48 47 46 45 43-44 41-44 38-40 ≤37 
 
T
ri
al
 1
 s
co
re
s 
49-50 432 19 2        453 
48 127 9 1        137 
47 84 18 
 
1       103 
46 78 12 1 1       92 
45 58 4 2 
 
1      65 
44 35 7 
 
2 1      45 
42-43 51 14 8 1 4 1 
 
1 
  
80 
40-41 20 11 6 5 2 1 2 3 1 
 
51 
37-39 11 7 5 5 1 4 5 3 4 1 46 
≤36 4 3 8 1 4 1 13 9 20 63 126 
 
 
900 104 33 16 13 7 20 16 25 64 1198 
 
 x    = definitely feigning by the TOMM manual’s criterion (N=125)   
 
 x    = definitely feigning based on study findings (N=36)    
 
 x    = probably feigning based on study findings (N=89)    
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Figure 1. – ROC graph showing the discriminatory performance of four performance 
validity tests under the agnostic knowledge assumption. WMT = Word Memory Test;  
TOMM Tr 1 = Test of Memory Malingering Trial 1; CARB = Computerized Assessment of 
Response Bias; CVLTFC = California Verbal Learning Test-II Forced Choice Trial. 
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Figure 2. – ROC graph showing the discriminatory performance of four performance 
validity tests under the partial truth knowledge assumption. WMT = Word Memory Test; 
TOMM Tr 1 = Test of Memory Malingering Trial 1; CARB = Computerized Assessment of 
Response Bias; CVLTFC = California Verbal Learning Test-II Forced Choice Trial. 
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Figure 3. – ROC graph showing the discriminatory performance of four performance 
validity tests under the agnostic knowledge assumption. WMT = Word Memory Test;  
TOMM Tr 2 = Test of Memory Malingering Trial 2; CARB = Computerized Assessment of 
Response Bias; CVLTFC = California Verbal Learning Test-II Forced Choice Trial. 
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Figure 4. – ROC graph showing the discriminatory performance of four performance 
validity tests under the partial truth knowledge assumption. WMT = Word Memory Test; 
TOMM Tr 2 = Test of Memory Malingering Trial 2; CARB = Computerized Assessment of 
Response Bias; CVLTFC = California Verbal Learning Test-II Forced Choice Trial. 
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Figure 5. – ROC graph comparing the discriminatory performance of Trial 1 and Trial 2 of 
the Test of Memory Malingering under the agnostic knowledge assumption. 
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Figure 6. – ROC graph comparing the discriminatory performance of Trial 1 and Trial 2 of 
the Test of Memory Malingering under the partial truth knowledge assumption. 
 
 
 
 
